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Abstracts. This paper subjects to examine how technology spillover affects input com-
petition and how input constraints impact firm innovation by a two-stage game model 
and theoretic analysis. The results show that with low spillover, the high cost firm can 
capture more input than the low cost firm through cost-reducing innovation. Adding input 
increases firms’ innovation, but it cannot improve the disadvantaged firm’s state under 
input constraint. Compared with non-cooperative innovation, cooperative innovation re-
duces innovation difference and firm size difference. The research implications are that 
disadvantage firms could take innovation spillover and capacity constraints as a competi-
tion strategy to obtain competition advantage and regulators should stimulate cooperative 
innovation to higher social welfare. The major value of this paper is that it combines 
capacity constraints and innovation investment originality.
Keywords: cost reducing innovation, input constraints, asymmetric competition, technol-
ogy spillover, game theory, strategic effects.
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Introduction
Capacity constraints are common in many industries. Arenas and cinemas have only limited 
number of seats, and airports can only land limited number of airplanes. Firms sustain capac-
ity constraints such as finance constraints (Love 2003; Whited 2006; Sena 2006; Carvajal 
et al. 2012), cash flow constraints (Kaplan, Zingales 2000), space constraints (Lester 2011), 
energy constraints (Veit et al. 2011), or information constraints (Ramadorai 2013). Capacity 
constraints change firms’ competition strategy. On one hand, constraints restrict performance 
and development of the firm. On the other hand, firms can also obtain strategic advantages 
from constraints (Riordan 2003; Khanna, Schroder 2010). For example, Deng and Yano 
(2006) showed that the firm with tight capacity constraints will adopt more aggressive price.
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In recent years, capacity constraints have received much attention (e.g. Sena 2004; 
Whited 2006; Adilov 2012; Van Den Berg et al. 2012; Ramadorai 2013). All these 
studies can be classified into four areas generally. Firstly, some have investigated the 
effects of capacity constraints on prices. For example, Ishibashi (2008) studied collu-
sive price equilibrium with capacity constraints and showed that capacity constraints 
heighten collusive leadership price. More interestingly, Arnold and Saliba (2011) im-
plied capacity constraints yield price dispersion and high constrained firm charges high 
price. Secondly, some prior researches focused on the relationships between capacity 
constraints and output or industrial structure. Nie and Chen (2012) investigated duopoly 
competition with input constraints. They declared that input constraints reduce market 
size difference and price difference. Esó et al. (2010) obtained similar results and they 
concluded that capacity constraints lead to industry symmetry. 
Part of the existent studies highlighted the effects of capacity constraints on other com-
petition strategies such as merger and collusion. Froeb et al. (2003) studied the effects 
of mergers among firms facing capacity constraints. Taking dynamic aspects of competi-
tion into account, Compte et al. (2002) investigated the effects of capacity constraints 
on mergers and collusion.Van Den Berg et al. (2012) discussed capacity constraints 
under dynamic Cournot competition and considered the effects of capacity constraints 
on equilibrium while Froeb et al. (2003) and Chowdhury (2009) analyzed capacity 
constraints under Bertrand competition. These studies show that capacity constraints 
induce industrial symmetry. Fourthly, there are also a few studies of capacity constraints 
inparticular industries such as service providers (Burkart et al. 2012; Wang, Dragahi 
2013), retail stores (Murray et. al 2012) and air transportation (Evans, Schaefer 2011).
Genc and Reynolds (2010) identified how capacity constraints affect output equilibrium 
with wholesale electricity markets, and they also found that capacity constraints result 
in symmetry. Besides, Inderst and Wambach (2001) analyzed competitive insurance 
markets with limited capital.
For one thing, among the existing researches of capacity constraints, none takes innova-
tion (or R&D investment) into account despite its obvious significance. For example, 
energy-dependent firms should invest in innovation to promote its efficiency because 
of the scarcity of energy resources. Different from other studies, we consider innova-
tion behavior with capacity constraints. The main purpose of this paper is to examine 
how technology spillover affects input competition and how input constraints affect 
firm innovation. We find that the conclusion drawn by prior studies such as Esó et al. 
(2010) and Nie and Chen (2012) that capacity constraints increase symmetry is not 
necessarily robust. For another thing, different from the major studies about cost re-
ducing innovations of D’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) and Suzumura (1992), we 
investigate innovation with asymmetric firms and obtain some interesting conclusions. 
Firstly, spillover has a major effect on duopoly competition. Large spillover aggravates 
the high cost firm’s status. But if spillover is small, the high cost firm can even obtain 
a competitive edge through innovation. Including innovation, we find input constraints 
increase firm symmetry only when spillover is low. Secondly, innovations of both firms 
increase as the input constraint bound increases. But increase in input constraint bound 
does not change the differences of innovation and firm size, because competitive firms 
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divide increments equally. Finally, cooperative innovation mitigates innovation differ-
ence and firm size difference.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Based on some assumptions, the basic 
model is established in Section 1. Then we analyze the model under different condi-
tions in Sections 2 and 3. Some discussions of the main conclusions are expounded in 
the last Section.
1. Setup
Two firms, denoted {1,2}∈i , with a constrained input and asymmetric costs produce per-
fectly substituting products. Denote the only input by ri for {1,2}∈i . Furthermore, 0>Rrepresents the total capacity in this industry or 1 2+ ≤r r R . Each firm transforms one unit 
input into one unit output efficiently, but with asymmetric costs1. The two firms produce 
homogenous products or product substitutability 1g = 2. And both of them launch R&D 
investments with spillover [0,1]β∈  to reduce their costs before output decisions, which 
means we consider a two-stage model3. Besides, we assume spillovers are symmetric be-
tween producers.
Let p denote the price, q1 and q2 the outputs of the two firms. As in Liu and Wang 
(2013), Sacco and Schmutzer (2011) or Liu et al. (2011), the inverse demand function 
of our study is given by the following:
 1 2 ,= − −p A q q . 
(1)
Both firms produce with the only input ri efficiently, which means:
 ,=i iq r .  
(2)
Denote firm 1 the low cost firm and firm 2 the high cost firm. Then the cost function with 
cost reducing innovation is given as the following:
 
( ) ,= = −βi i i j iC c x x r . 
(3)
In (3), xi and 
xj are the R&D investments of firm i and j for , {1,2}∈i j . Without loss of gen-
erality, we assume 1 0=c c  and 2 0= + tc c  are the initial unit costs of firms 1 and 2, where the constant 0t >  represents the cost difference or market power4. Cost of investment is 
quadratic, which is also employed by D’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), and Sacco and 
Schmutzer (2011). So the input-constrained producer i’s profit maximization problem is:
 
21( ) ( ) ,
2
. . .
π = − − − = −β −
+ <
i
i j i i i j i i
r
i j
Max A r r r c x x r x
S T r r R
  (4)
1 Considering that cost different already represents efficiency difference, we ignore the transform ef-
ficiency difference qi, i ∈ {1, 2} of Nie and Chen (2012).
2 Many studies investigated the relationship between substitutability and innovation (e.g. Holmes et al. 
2012; Nie and Chen 2012; Sacco and Schumtzer 2011; Aghion et al. 2005). Like D’Aspremont and 
Jacquemin (1988), we only consider the situation that g = 1.
3 Firms invest cost reducing innovation at the first stage and then make output decision at the second 
stage.
4 See in Nie and Chen (2012).
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To ensure that both firms’ inputs and investments are positive, the following assumption is 
necessary.
Assumption: 0t < c  and ≤R A .
This assumption means that the cost difference between firms should not be too large 
or the high cost firm will be forced to exit the market and that input constraints should 
be less than the largest market size. If input constraint is tight, then + =i jr r R. From 
equation (1), we get + <i jr r A . Then, we know that ≤R A.
The two firms play a two-stage game. At the first stage, they decide their best R&D 
investments simultaneously and then decide their output simultaneously at the second 
stage. All equilibrium solutions are obtained by backward induction. In what follows, 
we analyze our model both under non-cooperative innovation and undercooperative 
innovation5.
2. Non-cooperative innovation competition
The Lagrangian function of firm i’s profit maximization problem is:
 
21( ) ( ) ( ).
2
= − − − − −β − + λ − −i i j i i i j i i i i jL A r r r c x x r x R r r   (5)
Case 1: Non-binding constraint. Non-binding constraint means 1 2+ <r r R  and 1 2 0λ = λ =  . 
We analyze the model by backward induction. Given innovation levels at the first stage, 




(2 ) (2 1) ,
3
− + t + −β + β −
=






2 (2 1) (2 ) .
3
− − t + β − + −β
=
A c x xr   (7)






(4 2 )[( )(1 6 2 ) (3 4 2 ) ] ,
(1 6 2 )(5 2 2 )
− β − − β + β − − β + β t
=








(4 2 )[( )(1 6 2 ) 2(1 ) ] ,
(1 6 2 )(5 2 2 )
− β − − β + β + + β t
=
− β + β − β + β
A cx . (9)
From (8) and (9) we draw the following conclusions.
5 The second-mover firm will be forced to exit the market by the first-mover firm under input con-
straints Stackelberg competition if g = 1. So we ignore leader-follower competition.
6 Denote e as a small constant. Then there exists a small range 3 7 3 7,
2 2
 − −
− e + e 
  
 makes x1 < 0. 
That means if 3 7 3 7,
2 2
 − −
β∈ − e + e 
  
, then x1 should be equal to 0 and xi = 0 is beyond our 
study, so 3 7 3 7,
2 2
 − −




Y. Chen et al. Asymmetric doupoly competition with innovation spillover and input constraints
Proposition 1. Denote 1β  as a constant given in the appendix. (i) When 1β < β , x1 decreases while x2 increases with t. (ii). When 1β > β , x1 increases while x2 decreases with t7.
Proof: See the appendix. 
Remarks. Proposition 1 shows that the spillover of innovation plays a major role in 
innovation competition. If spillover is small, the cost disadvantaged firm can mitigate 
its disadvantage by innovation. The larger the cost disadvantage, the stronger the in-
novation incentive for the disadvantaged firm. But if the spillover is larger than β , the 
relationship between cost difference and innovation of the duopoly will reverse. Note 
that if t = 0, our conclusions are the same as D’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), 
which means their study is a special case of ours.
Combining (8) with (9), we obtain the investment difference Dx (or | x1 – x2|) and total 
investments
 
Sx (or | x1 + x2|) easily, as given by:
 
2




β − − β




2(2 )(2 2 ) .
5 2 2
−β − t −
S =




Then we achieve the following proposition.






> ≤ β <
¶β













> ≤ β <
¶β¶t

¶ D − < < β ≤ ¶β¶t
x
x
.  (iii) 0¶S <
¶t









Proof: See the appendix.
Remarks. Proposition 2 shows that the high cost firm innovates more if spillover is 
small, while the low cost firm innovates more if spillover is large. In other words, 
small spillover stimulates the high cost firm’s innovation while high spillover stimu-
lates the low cost firm’s innovation. But the increase of spillover inhibits total inno-
vation which is consistent with reality. Externality is harmful for innovation, so our 
society needs patent protection to protect the profits of innovating firms. On the one 
hand, cost difference, which also is regarded as market power (Nie and Chen 2012), 
enlarges innovation difference. On the other hand, cost difference reduces total innova-





β = is the root of 21 6 2 0− β + β = .
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illustrates that cost difference boosts the relationship of spillover and innovation dif-
ference because 
2  ¶D ¶ D
=   
¶β ¶β¶t   
x xsign sign and part (iii) of Proposition 2 shows that 
cost difference attenuates the relationship of spillover and total innovation because
2  ¶S ¶ S
= −   
¶β ¶β¶t   
x xsign sign .
Substituting (8) and (9) back into (5) and solving obtains the final expressions of the 





3(1 6 2 )( ) 3(3 4 2 ) ,
(1 6 2 )(5 2 2 )
− β + β − − − β + β t
=








3(1 6 2 )( ) 6(1 ) .
(1 6 2 )(5 2 2 )
− β + β − + + β t
=
− β + β − β + β
A cr   (13)










Differentiating expressions (12)–(14) with respect to t and β, we acquire the following 
conclusions.
Proposition 3. (i) 1 2<r r if 1β < β  and 1 2>r r if 1β > β . (ii) When 1β < β , 
1 0¶ <
¶t





r . When 1β > β , 
1 0¶ >
¶t
r , 2 0¶ <
¶t
r and 0¶D >
¶t







Proof: See the appendix. 
Remarks. It is a general conclusion that the cost advantaged firm produces more than its 
cost disadvantaged competitors. But interestingly, Proposition 3 shows that if innovation 
spillover is small, the disadvantaged incumbent can improve its status or even obtain an 
advantage by innovation. Proposition 3 also indicates that the relationship between cost 
difference and output depends on innovation spillover. High innovation spillover is ben-
eficial to the high cost firm because spillover decreases input difference. More interest-
ingly, the increase of cost difference reduces the effect of spillover on input difference.
Case 2. Tight constraint. Tight constraint means 1 2+ +r r R and 1 0λ > , 1 0λ > . To 
simplify the analysis, we further assume that 1 2λ = λ , which means the shadow prices 





(1 )( ) ,
2









(1 )( ) .
2





Comparing (15) and (16) with (6) and (7), we find that without innovation * *1 2( )−r r is ex-
actly equal to 1 2( )−r r . Substituting *1r  and  r*2      into (5), we have:
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2 3 2 3 2 3
0*
21 2
( 4 ) ( )(1 5 5 ) (2 3 4 ) ,
(1 )(1 4 )
β − β + β + − − β + β −β − − β + β −β t
=
+ β − β + β




2 3 2 3 2
0*
2 2 2
( 4 ) ( )(1 5 5 ) (1 2 ) .
(1 )(1 4 )
β − β + β + − − β + β −β + + β −β t
=












− β + β





12 2(1 )( )
2
1












(1 4 ) 2
2(1 4 )
− β + β − t
=








(1 4 ) 2
2(1 4 )
− β + β + t
=
− β + β












From (17)–(23), we obtain the following conclusions.
Proposition 4. All propositions under non-binding constraint hold in tight constraint 
situation.
Proof: From the proofs of Propositions 1 to 3 we can get the conclusions of Proposition 
4 by straightforward calculations9.
Remarks. Proposition 4 shows that all the conclusions above are robust. There also ex-
ists 2β  such that * *1 2>r r when 2β < β , and * *1 2<r r when 2β > β 10. But 1 2β < β , which 
means comparing with non-tight constraints, in tight constraints circumstance the cost 
disadvantaged firm has more chance to plunder more input or market share than its 
competitor. In other words, the high cost firm benefits from input constraints. Different 
from innovation, inputs of the firms are only decided by R, t and β. Maximum market 





























8 Denote e a small constant, then there exists a small range 2 3 ,2 3 − − e − + e  in which x1 < 0. 
Which means if 2 3 ,2 3 β∈ − − e − + e  , then x1 should be equal to 0. 
* 0=ix is out of our study, 
so 2 3 ,2 3 β∉ − − e − + e  .





β = ≈ and 2 2 3 0.268β = − ≈ , so we get 1 2β < β  easily. 2β is the root of
   21 4 0− β + β = .
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Proof: Differentiating (17)–(20) with respect to R, we obtain, 
* *
1 2
2 0(1 4 )
¶ ¶ β
= = >


























Conclusions are therefore achieved and the proof is complete. 
Remarks. Proposition 5 reveals that, as R increases, innovation of firms, total innova-
tion and output of the industry increase. And both the increase rate of innovation and 
output of the firms are the same. More interestingly, innovation of the firm has noth-
ing to do with R if spillover is equal to 0 or no innovation spillover. Furthermore, any 
incremental input will be divided by the two firms equally, which means increasing 
input resources of the constrained industry cannot improve the status of the cost dis-
advantaged producer or firm size difference has nothing to do with the increase of R.
Proposition 6. Total innovation, innovation difference and input difference under different 









D < D ≤ β <














D < D ≤ β <





Proof: See the appendix. 
Remarks. Esó et al. (2010) indicated that capacity constraints lead to industrial symme-
try and our conclusion is the same as theirs if spillover β is equal to 0. But Proposition 
6 implies that if duopoly competes with innovation and innovation has spillover, capac-
ity constraints do not necessarily result in symmetry. Furthermore, capacity constraints 
even increase industrial asymmetry if innovation spillover is high.
3. Cooperative innovation 
Prior studies have showed that cooperative innovation makes things different (D’Aspre-
montand Jacquemin 1988; Suzumura 1992; Erkal, Piccinin 2010). Next we analyze our 
model under cooperative innovation. Cooperative innovation means firms decide their op-
timal equilibrium innovations based on the joint profit maximization problem. Two firms 
make innovation decisions based on joint profit maximization at the first stage and then 
decide their outputs separately at the second stage. Here we also use backward induction 
to solve the problem. Denote the joint profit function as  1 2 1 2 1 2[ , , , ], (1,2)π + π = =f r r x x i . 
( , )i i jr x x  and xi are the output and innovation of firm , (1,2)=i i . Then optional equilibrium 
innovation is given by:
                     xi = arg  max 1 2 1 2 1 2arg max ( ) [ , , , ], (1,2).= π + π =ix f r r x x i                              (24) 
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− β − β + β − − − β + β t
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2[(1 3 2 2 )( ) (3 4 2 ) ] ,
7 32 28 4
− β − β + β − + − β + β t
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2(1 )(2 2 ) .
7 4 2
+ β − − t
S =




In the model of D’Aspremontand and Jacquemin (1988), 1
cx is equal to 2cx  and 0D =cx  
because they did not consider cost difference t. If t = 0, we also have 1 2=
c cx x  and 0D =cx  ,
 
and our conclusions are the same as D’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988).
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− β + β − − + β − β t
=

















(1 3 2 2 ) 2(1 ) ,
2 8 4
− β − β + β − −β t
=








(1 3 2 2 ) 2(1 ) .
2 8 4
− β − β + β + −β t
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* (1 ) .S = + βcx R   (35)
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− β + β − t
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All the conclusions under non-cooperative innovation are still valid under cooperativein-
novation. Moreover, comparing the results of cooperative innovation with those of non-
cooperative innovation, we have the following conclusions.
Proposition 7. *D = Dc cx x  and *D = Dc cr r .




D = = D
− β + β




D = = D
− β + β
c cr r .
Conclusions are therefore achieved and the proof is complete. 
Remarks. Proposition 7 shows that if firms make cooperative innovation decisions, no 
matter input constraint is tight or not, the differences of innovation and input are the 
same. 
Proposition 8. Innovation and input difference and total innovation of non-coopera-
tive and cooperative meet the following relationship: D < Dcx x, * *D < Dcx x , D < Dcr r, 





S ≤ S < β <












S ≤ S ≤ β ≤ β







Proof: See in appendix. 
Remarks. Cooperative innovation always reduces the difference of inputs (or firm size), 
but cooperative innovation increases total innovation if spillover is large. If spillover is 
small, comparing with non-cooperative innovation, cooperative innovation inhibits total 
innovation. The results above illustrate that the disadvantaged firm always benefits from 
cooperative innovation, but things for the advantaged firm and consumers are ambigu-
ous. Our research partly explains the phenomenon that non-cooperative innovation and 
cooperative innovation coexist. Because spillovers of innovation are different, firms take 
different innovation strategies (cooperative innovation or non-cooperative innovation) 
under which they carry out different innovation. The breakpoint β  in Proposition 8 is 
dependent on the relationship of R and 0
1( )
2
− − tA c .
Discussion and conclusions
In this study, we investigate how innovation spillover affects input competition and how cost 
difference, spillover and capacity constraints affect innovation with input constraints under 
Cournot competition. Different from earlier study, our study shows that even when coopera-
tive innovation strategies are adopted by firms, both input and innovation of different firms 
are not the same due to the existence of cost difference. Prior studies illustrated that capacity 
constraints lead to symmetric firms, which means capacity constraints reduce the high cost 
firm’s disadvantage. Our study shows that the high cost firm can even acquire competition 
advantage or plunder more input than the low cost firm by cost-reducing innovation under 
low spillover condition. But high innovation spillover enlarges the input difference between 
firms and high spillover inhibits innovation investment of high cost firm. Increasing total 
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input change nothings because any unit increase input will be divided equally by the two 
firms. Interestingly, the increase of constraints bound raises innovation.
The conclusion reached by early studies that cooperative innovation results in sym-
metric innovation is not a general conclusion if firms compete with asymmetric costs, 
but cooperative innovation reduces input difference and innovation difference. Although 
cooperative innovation reduces innovation and input difference, it increases total in-
novation under high innovation spillover and consumers do not always benefit from 
cooperative innovation. Furthermore, this study reveals that the high cost firm prefers 
low innovation spillover, while the low cost firm prefers high spillover.
This paper combines capacity constraints and innovation investment originality. In other 
words, we offer a valuable discussion about cost reducing innovation under capacity 
constraints, which expends the application of innovation theory. The major research 
implications are that disadvantage firms could take innovation spillover and capacity 
constraints as a competition strategy to obtain competition advantage and regulators 
should stimulate cooperative innovation to higher social welfare. Besides, people should 
pay more attention to constrained input capacity because it has significant impact on 
competition and industrial development.
Comparing with some of the earlier studies, the model of this study is more general. 
This study only considers quantity-sensitive capacity constraints, while quality-sensitive 
capacity constraints in a more interesting issue. Another important market factor, prod-
uct substitution also has major effect on output and innovation competition, so further 
study will include product substitutability and quality-sensitive capacity constraints. If 
products offered by different firms are not prefect substitutes, our study can be extended 
to Stackelberg competition.
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APPENDIX
Table 1. The relationships between variables and parameters
¶t ¶β ¶β¶t ¶R ¶t ¶β ¶β¶t
La Sa La Sa La Sa Lb Sb Lb Sb Lb Sb
x1 – + – – – – x1* + – + – –
x2 + – + + x2* + + – + +
r1 – + – – r1* 1/2 – + – – – –
r2 + – + + r2* 1/2 + – + + + +
Dx + + + – + – Dx
* 0 + + + – + +
Sx – – – – + + Sx* + – – + +
Dr – + – – – – Dr* 0 – + – – – –
Notes: La and Sa means 3 7
2
−
β < and 3 7
2
−
β > , while Lb and Sb means 2 3β < −  and 2 3β > −  . 
All the results are obtained by differentiated variables by parameters.
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Proof of Proposition 1






(4 2 )(3 4 2 ) 3 70, 0
2(1 6 2 )(5 2 2 )
(4 2 )(3 4 2 ) 3 70, 1
2(1 6 2 )(5 2 2 )
 − β − β + β −
− < ≤ β <
− β + β − β + β¶ = 
¶t − β − β + β −− > < β ≤ − β + β − β + β
x
 and




4(2 )(1 ) 3 70, 0
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¶t −β + β − < < β ≤ − β + β − β + β
x
.
Conclusions are therefore achieved and the proof is complete.
Proof of Proposition 2
From (8) easy to get 1 2
2
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Conclusions are therefore achieved and the proof is complete. 
Proof of Proposition 3
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r r . From (12) 
to (14), we get 
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Conclusions are therefore achieved and the proof is complete. 
Proof of Proposition 6
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. For the same reason we achieved 
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Conclusions are therefore achieved and the proof is complete. 
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x . Because 2( 1) 2(2 )β − t < −β t
and 2 21 4 2 1 6 2− β + β > − β + β , so easy to get D < Dcx x . For the same reason, we 
have * *D < Dcx x , D < Dcr r  and * *D < Dcr r . Subtracted equation (28) by (11), we have 
0
2 2
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Conclusions are therefore achieved and the proof is complete. 
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